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1;1.11 11 1_,JPflf.fT, KEITH GURR 
11111 '.1ii\H Pi\NCH LANDS, a 
µart.nerc,r11 p, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
LEE A. FITZGERALD, HELEN 
,-J f ZGERALD, his wife, 
i'ERRY G. FITZGERALD and 
1:AROLYN FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 19225 
Except for two corrections the Nature of the Case is set forth yy 
i\ppellants' statement. The first is that the contract involving the 
respondents Fitzgeralds was dated March, 1978, not February, 1978. Also 
the issue of slander of title was not litigated in this case and can not 
hereafter be litigated because that issue is now res judicata as a result 
of the dismissal of Appellants' prior appeal of the judgment of the lower 
1.oi1rl as to these respondents in Case No. 18529 dated November 1, 1982. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
1 11·• this Court dismissed with prejudice Appellants' prior appeal 
,,, 1 11 LhPse respondents, the trial court amended, corrected, and clarified 
'' • judyments, pursuant to Rule 60(a). Its judgment as to these respondents 
is dated May 17, 1981, an•i the i111PnrlmP•1 1 r1n\1f 1 1·tt:11 t~lP l)t'l{)t~ r)r'1('r' +11 
convey certain propert 1 rece1 ·;eu hi a1•1,el I Jn le d'~ 3 1own payment on 
the March, 1978, contract lane~ ~old by thPm prior tn trial which resulte 
in the May 17, 1982, judgment I into' money judgment since appellants 
were not able to comply with that order. It also corrected the oversigr 
of a $48,500 mortgage so as to allow judgment to these respondents for 
only the net amount since only such net 1vas received by appellants, It 
also adjusted the value of the property received by these respondents 
to market value rather than contract value ($240 per acre rather than 
$320 as per the contract), The lower court reaffirmed its position that 
"fhe decision should be and is based upon the equitable principle of 
L11just enrichment." ( R 930) 
RELIEF SQU[HT ON APPEAL 
Appel 1 ants state they "seek revers a 1 of the judgment on the Februar. 
78 Contract" despite the fact that such judgment was appealed from in 
Case No. 18529 and that appeal was dismissed with prejudice on November 
l, 1981 (see Supreme Court motion file in that case). 
Respondents' position as to the claimed relief based on slander of 
title is set forth under Nature of Case and is hereby incorporated by 
reference. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS TO PERRY G. AND CAROLYN FITZGERALD 
Appell ants' statement ot the facts is f I a vied because ( 1) it makes 
attempt to limit the facts to the proper scope of this appeal; (2) it 
does not canvas those facts in the l qht most favorable to the prevail 
party; (3) it does not cite the record as to vihere those facts are to:-
found. 
-3-
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1
rJte fJc".:s are as fo11ows: 
·:1;.·r e:ntry •Jf the Judgment of May 17, 1982, Appellants did not 
'·'' 1', 'ri these 'Jespondents the property they were ordered to convey because 
th~; .01 11 that property prior to that judgment. (R 930) 
2 The difference in value between what Appellants received as a down 
payment (an apartment house and other property having a value of $125,000 
but encumbered by a $48,500 mortgage) and what Respondents received (60 acres 
rif unimproved land worth 5240 per acre) was $62,100. (R 931, 932) 
There were expert opinions that the value of the property received 
by Appellants was more ($203,000 according to Respondents' expert). 
4. No evidence concerning slander of title was offered or received by 
the luwer court after Case No. 18529 was dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED A JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES 
AGAINST RESPONDENT PERRY FITZGERALD FOR SLANDER OF TITLE AS 
SUCH ISSUE ~AS NOT LITIGATED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS NOT 
REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT. 
Under Argument in Appellants' brief only their Point VII (No. 7 in 
Table of Contents is not the same) is directed at these Respondents and 
it 1s not the same as set forth above. 
PPspondents will deal with them in the order in which they appear in 
the brief, i e., No. 7, l, then Vil. As to No. 7, it is significant that 
,1J 1ror tile ')tacement of Facts (P 25-29) the term "slander of title" does 
' ,, (IP,, ,,; a I I and none of tre facts there stated relate to it. The 
unly place other than in the table of contents where that term appears 
-4-
is in (l) the Relief sou<Jht 'in ''~pe.il 
authority is there cited 111 0UP~u1 l thPrP<>r, 1,:J un ~ 38 under- "Point 
where no issue is posed and thP notice (eferred to is based on the con-
tract Respondents had with Leland Fitzy<=rald, not Appellants. 
As to l {P. 36), the Appellants set up a "otraw man" and knock it 
down, to wit: Respondents' rights under the i'larch 1978 contract. 
Respondents never claimed at trial that they had any. They abandoned 
that contract after it became clear to them that they would not acquire 
any title thereunder since Appellants could only convey title to them by 
performing on their underlying contract to Leland Fitzgerald and wife as 
the latter held the title and contended (correctly the lower court found 
that Appell ants were in default on that contract. The trial court did~: 
grant relief to Respondents based on that contract but to the contrary 
concluded that the March 78 contract had not been performed by either pa· 
that performances of each party were concurrent conditions which had not 
been fulfilled (hence in effect rescinded by abandonment by both parties 
The only issue was whEther the payments made would be forfeited or be 
subject to restitution. In view of the vast disparity in values receive 
the lower court properly ordered restitution (in kind initially, in mane 
subsequently) to prevent unjust enrichment. ( R 930) 
As to Vil, it's not clear how it is related to 'o'ihich preceeds it 
Page 36 but in any event all that was said as to ~~o 7 above is applica: 
in response to it and hence will not be repeated. 
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"'l'C'l ldnts cite tV10 cases in support of their position. Neither 
~.e is in µoint. In Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 (1963), this 
urnrt •iranted summary judgment in favor of a seller of real estate who 
V1as sued by the buyer after the buyer had resold and the initial seller 
had repossessed upon default by the subsequent buyer and also the initial 
buyer. The basic claim V1as one of recovering payments made to avoid an 
unconscionable forfeiture. The case is clearly distinguishable on two 
grounds: l) The buyer there was admittedly in default and the seller 
was not. In our case the tri a 1 court found that "neither party made a 
conditional tender of the performance required on September 6, 1978, 
sufficient to place the other party in breach of contract" (R 756, 
Finding of Fact No. 8), hence neither party was in default. 2) There 
was no disparity in considerations exchanged in the Strand case. In 
tact this Court there found that the buyers received"$l ,699.00 more than 
they have paid" (P. 357). In this case the disparity was $62,100 (R 932). 
Hence that case is no precedent for relief on appeal and in any event such 
an argument should have been made in Case No. 18529, not in this one. 
The second case referrred to above was that of Corporation Nine v. 
I~ylor, 30 Utah 2d 47 (1973). There the lower court found for the sellers 
dnd the trial court was not required to find an estoppel under the facts there 
(here such an issue V1as not even raised) stating "This court on review will 
rint overturn his determination and compel such a finding unless the evidence 
, lc·J1l1 preponderates to the contrary" (R 52). Here the evidence does not 
"c !early preponderate to the contrary" and in any event the time for such 
- f, 
a finding on the issue of breach of contr~ct wa~ when that issue Nas 
before this court (or potentially so since no brief was ever filed) on 
the basis of the May 1982 judgment rather than that of the judgment 
of April 19, 1983, which did not deal with the issue of breach but only 
with the sum to be awarded Respondents to avoid unjust enrichment. 
CDNCLUS ION 
There is no merit to any points raised by Appellants in their 
brief. Most importantly~ of the issues raised therein are a 
matter of res judicata due to the dismissal of Case No. 18529 on 
November l, 1982. The only proper function of this appellate court as 
to the proceedings subsequent to that data would be to correct the 
lower court if its determination of value necessary to convert a propert; 
award into a money judgment was not supported PY substantial evidence. 
Appellants do not even contend that the valuation fixed by the lower 
court did not find such support in the evidence and had they raised the 
issue it would not have been effective since the valuation was within 
the range of the experts' opinions and in fact was closer to Appellants' 
expert than 1D Respondents' expert. 
Dated this 12th day of September, 1983. 
;Q~~B U~ 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Respondents 
Perry G. anc Carolyn Fi tzgera 
